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In early 2009 the US government introduced The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), a massive direction of US stimulus spending to 
kickstart the US economy.  The ARRA contained clauses which made some 
stimulus spending at the sub-federal level conditional on the purchase of US 
goods and services.  While certainly not a novel American response, the 
restrictive provisions of the ARRA attracted much Canadian attention.  This 
paper examines the current status of Canadian sub-federal procurement law, 
in light of agreements reached between Canada and the US in response to the 
ARRA.  It argues that the Canadian response to the ARRA is problematic 
based on the historical and current practice of sub-federal procurement by 
the Canadian government. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On February 17, 2009, facing an economic crisis of massive 
proportions, Barack Obama signed the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the “ARRA”) into law.  The bill, 
encompassing close to 800 billion dollars in stimulus government 
spending, was intended to ignite the waning American economy and 
bring much needed growth to the United States.1  What it ignited, 
however, was Canadian sentiment and ire. The ARRA contained 
several clauses which make stimulus funding conditional on the 
procurement of US manufactured goods, and these clauses prompted 
strong objections from Canadian business, media, and government.2 
 The strong Canadian reaction to the provisions of the ARRA 
extended to all levels of government, prompting meetings of 
provincial premiers and correspondence from the Canadian Trade 
Minister to his American counterpart.3  Eventually, Canada and the 
United States entered negotiations and, on February 5, 2010, 
concluded an agreement which promised to alleviate the detrimental 
Buy American provisions of the ARRA for Canadian businesses, the 
Agreement Between The Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United States of America on Government Procurement (the 
“Agreement”)4.  This paper aims to deconstruct and analyze this 
agreement. 
                                                            
1 Micheael A. Fletcher, “Obama Leaves D.C. to Sign Stimulus Bill” The Washington 
Post (18 February 2009), online: 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021700
221.html>. 
2 Tonda MacCharles and Les Whittinton, “Obama’s ‘Buy American’ plan blasted” The 
Toronto Star (30 January 2009), online: <http://www.thestar.com/article/579557> 
[MacCharles]. 
3 Milos Barutciski and Jesse I. Goldman, Canadian Government Moves to Counter 
‘Buy American’ Protectionism, (2009) International Trade and Investment Group 
Update (Bennett Jones LLP), online at: < 
http://www.bennettjones.com/Images/Guides/update7464.pdf> [Barutciski]; Meeting 
of the Council of the Federation, Premiers call for new Agreement with the United 
States, (Ottawa: 9 June 2009), online: 
<http://www.councilofthefederation.ca/pdfs/NewsRelease_BuyAmerican.pdf> 
[Council June 09]. 
4 Agreement Between The Government of Canada and The Government of the United 
States of America on Government Procurement, Canada and United States, 5 
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 I begin by examining the relevant context of treaties and 
agreements which already bind the procurement decisions of the 
various levels of Canadian government.  As we will see, sub-federal 
procurement is conspicuously absent from many of these agreements; 
this absence calls for an examination of the Canadian policy and 
platform in relation to such procurement.  I also look to the relevant 
provincial concerns and the business perspective in an attempt to 
develop an understanding of the implications any agreement on sub-
federal procurement will have. 
 I then turn to examine the recent Buy American controversy, 
and finally, the text of the Agreement itself.  I analyze the reciprocal 
concessions from the United States and Canada, and, drawing from 
the perspectives discussed in the first half of the paper, discuss 
whether or not Canada stands to receive—to borrow the term from 
the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Agency—a ‘net benefit’ 
from the Agreement.  In the end, my analysis finds that Canada's 
response was reactionary and undisciplined, especially when 
contrasted with the historically reserved Canadian position, and that 
the exemptions realized pale in contrast to the promises given.  
Furthermore, while the extent of the Canadian promises has yet to be 
realized, the lion's share of gains to be had from the American 
concessions are either still restricted from Canadian bidders or already 
contracted to American companies. 
 
II 
THE CANADIAN SUB-FEDERAL PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
 
i) Sub-Federal Procurement in Canadian FIPAs, NAFTA, and the 
WTO GPA 
 
Prior to entering the Agreement, Canada’s obligations to 
foreign investors relating to government procurement were already 
numerous.  In many instances, however, exceptions to generally open 
                                                                                                                                     
February 2010 (entered into force 16 February 2010), online: 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ENG-Canada-
USA%20Government%20Procurement%20%28clean%2011%20Feb%202010%20prin
ted%29.pdf> [Agreement].  
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procurement policies favoured and continue to favour Canadian 
businesses and production.  Understanding the rationale behind 
government decisions to exclude certain sectors and procurement 
agents is fundamental to understanding what is at stake in any 
agreement which overturns those exclusions.  In this section I review 
Canadian policy and look at the current concerns which animate the 
decision to enter the Agreement. 
 
ii) Federal Planning, Policies and Prognostications  
 
Canadian federal policy on FDI has been the subject of 
contentious debate for decades.  It arose as a subject of discussion 
primarily following the conclusion of the Second World War, when 
trade integration and multinational private firms were seen as part of 
the solution to global military catastrophe.  Again, a deep evaluation 
of Canadian FDI policy is beyond the scope of this paper, but several 
developments that have continued to influence current policy 
relevant to government procurement warrant consideration.  One 
development was the purposeful study of FDI, which came notably in 
the form of two studies, conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s: 
The Watkins Report and the Gray Report.5  The Gray Report, the later 
of the two, highlighted a number of potential benefits that FDI could 
provide to the recipient nation—skills impartation to Canadians, 
heightened competitiveness in industry, and new export markets—
but tempered these advantages with a careful analysis of the 
downsides of FDI.  Among these were the dangers posed by increased 
vertical integration or inputs tied to a foreign economy; truncation of 
key value-added elements of the business chain; worrisome cultural 
practices or laws which can become de facto imported into Canada; 
and the dangers inherent in sharing technology with nations who 
may pose a political threat.6 
 The follow up to the Gray Report affirms the caution 
regarding FDI that characterized Canadian decision makers.  
Following the publication of the Gray Report, the Foreign Investment 
Review Act (the “FIRA”) was enacted which, among other things, 
                                                            
5 A. Edward Safarian, Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey of Canadian Research, 
(Quebec: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1985) at 39. 
6 The Honourable Herb Gray, Foreign Direct Investment in Canada, (Ottawa, 
Information Canada, 1972) at 41-45 [Gray]. 
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created an agency to review foreign mergers and takeovers of 
Canadian corporations beyond certain threshold limits.  This agency, 
still active today under the Investment Canada Act, recently used its 
power to block foreign acquisition for the first time, prohibiting the 
American takeover of a Canadian space-focused research and 
development company.7 
 This historical context indicates that Canada’s approach to FDI 
has been strategic and selective.  The federal government approached 
FDI from a cautious perspective, cognizant of the dangers that a high 
concentration of foreign ownership could impose.  Government 
procurement, however, is best regarded as a special subset of general 
FDI.  Procurement does not generally entail continued foreign 
ownership, but rather comprises the contractual agreements for the 
government’s acquisition of goods or provision of services.  Granted, 
the recent boom in public-private partnerships (“P3s”) is a 
procurement phenomenon, but since a discussion of P3s would 
overwhelm this paper, I focus generally on procurement that fits the 
above description.8  As I will show, federal policy towards 
government procurement has remained strategic and selective, albeit 
tempered by Canada’s acceptance of increasingly restrictive free-trade 
agreements like NAFTA. 
 First, the policies of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat 
(“TBCS”), responsible for implementing Cabinet-approved programs 
and securing the resources necessary to implement executive decisions 
are indicative of how Canada manages its procurement needs.  The 
TBCS, acting pursuant to the Financial Administration Act, has the 
authority to determine contracting policy within Canada and, as such, 
has influential control over the scope and management of federal 
procurement.9  The TBCS’s Contracting Policy, in particular, lays out 
specific policy guidelines for all government purchasing and 
contracting. The Board’s stated objective is to “acquire goods and 
services and to carry out construction in a manner that enhances 
                                                            
7 See Denis Gascon, Canada Uses Investment Canada Act to Block Acquisition of 
MDA by Alliant Techsystems, (2008) Competition/Antitrust Information (Ogilvy 
Renault LLP), online: <http://www.ogilvyrenault.com/files/510-e.PDF>. 
8 For an overview of recent P3 developments within Canada, see Mario Iacobacci, 
“Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships for 
Infrastructure Investments”, Conference Board of Canada (2010). 
9 Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11 s.7. 
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access, competition and fairness and results in best value or, if 
appropriate, the optimal balance of overall benefits to the Crown and 
the Canadian people.”10  The policy’s mention of “fairness” and  
“competition” is, in part, a response to the sponsorship scandal that 
implicated the Canadian Liberal government in 2004.11 However, the 
final part of the stated objective contemplates an assessment of overall 
Canadian benefit upon consideration of decisions.  This type of 
assessment tracks, to an extent, the wording of the Investment Canada 
Act. This act makes decisions about foreign ownership based on an 
assessment of “net benefit” to Canada. It appears that there is a 
connection between policy-based evaluations of FDI in general and 
procurement decisions specifically.12 
 Further support for the position that the Canadian 
government manages federal procurement strategically is found in the 
Contracting Policy Notice of 2007 (published by the TBCS).  This 
Notice states that the Contracting Policy objective is purposefully 
broad in order to “[permit the] government to use procurement to 
complement other government priorities”.13  These “other 
government priorities” include “long-term industrial and regional 
development and other appropriate national objectives, including 
aboriginal economic development.”14 
Aboriginal economic development is an area of special 
concern to Canadian federal officials, and is an interesting example of 
how the Canadian government has managed tensions between 
international obligations and domestic policy.  The Procurement 
Strategy for Aboriginal Businesses (“PSAB”) is an initiative 
undertaken by the federal government in an effort to foster aboriginal 
                                                            
10 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Contracting Policy, online:<http://www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=14494> at para 1[Contracting Policy]. 
11 For a detailed discussion of the scandal, see the summary of the report “Who is 
Responsible”, drafted after the extensive hearings of the Gomery Commission.  The 
report is available from Publishing and Depository Services, Public Works and 
Government Services of Canada, online: <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-
bcp/commissions/sponsorship-ef/06-03-
06/www.gomery.ca/en/phase1report/summary/es_full_v01.pdf>. 
12 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C., 1985, (1st Supp.) c. 28, s.16(1). 
13 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Contracting Policy Notice 2007-04 - Non-
Competitive Contracting, online: <http://www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/dcgpubs/contpolnotices/2007/0920-eng.asp> [Policy Notice Sept 
2007]. 
14 Contracting Policy, supra note 17, at para 2. 
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development and support socio-economic growth in First Nations 
communities.  It accomplishes its mandate by restricting bidding on 
government contracts for goods and services which “primarily benefit 
Aboriginal people” with a value of over $5000 to Aboriginal 
businesses through a set-aside process.15  The PSAB is able to restrict 
federal procurement contracts in this manner because it operates 
under an exclusion clause in NAFTA that allows set-asides for small 
and minority businesses.16   
This small example illustrates how the Canadian federal 
government, while committing itself to a high level of foreign 
competition through the agreements discussed in the first section of 
this paper, attempts to maintain a level of discretion and control over 
its procurement decisions.  Exceptions (such as the PSAB) are 
critically important for Canada to maintain control over the way its 
procurement decisions affect uniquely Canadian domestic issues.  But 
what about uniquely Canadian issues which are not exempt from the 
provisions of NAFTA and the GPA?  Concerns over troubled 
Canadian industries beg a strategic approach beyond small NAFTA 
exemptions and, until recently, the absence of sub-federal 
procurement within international obligations has given Canada a 
mechanism by which to maintain strategic control.  It is possible to 
view the government as being in a contest with its own international 
obligations.  Federal goals such as “support[ing] Canadian industries in 
difficulty…and protect[ing] the families and communities who 
depend on those jobs” may be frustrated by agreements which 
mandate foreign competition. 17  The government’s own Policy Notice 
admits that “Canada’s Trade Agreements remove some flexibility on 
how government may use the procurement system for other needs.”18  
Examined against this background, the incentive of the federal 
government to push for provincial procurement commitments 
(outside of negotiations mandated by NAFTA and the GPA19) seems 
                                                            
15 Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Canada, Procurement 
Strategy for Aboriginal Business, Performance Report 2004 (Ottawa: Minister of 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006) [PSAB]. 
16NAFTA, supra note 8 at Annex 1001.2b(d). 
17 Canada, Governor General, Speech from the Throne, 40th Parl. 2nd sess., (26 
January 2009). 
18 Policy Notice Sept 2007, supra note 20. 
19 GPA, supra note 9 at Article XXIV:7(b); NAFTA, supra note 8 at Article 1024. 
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limited, and may explain why sub-federal obligations were absent for 
so long. 
Finally, federal pressure on sub-federal procurement may 
have been limited because of negotiation tactics during WTO 
meetings on the GPA.  In a response to questions about sub-federal 
procurement from a WTO committee, Canadian delegates responded 
that: 
Canada is prepared to table an offer at the sub-central level if, 
and only if, members are prepared: (1) to include sectors of 
priority to Canadian suppliers, for example, in the steel and 
transportation areas; and (2) to agree to circumscribe the use 
of small business and other set asides in a manner that, while 
not precluding their use, would provide an acceptable 
security of access to suppliers from all members of this 
committee.20 
Collins argues that, during these negotiations, Canada was basically 
using provincial procurement as a bargaining chip to try to extract 
beneficial treatment for Canadian industries with other WTO 
member states (a strategy that was unsuccessful in the WTO 
negotiations).21  The Agreement, then, can be viewed as a 
continuation of this strategy: an exchange of Canadian provincial 
procurement for reciprocal access in the American market.  But is the 
Agreement as beneficial for Canada as WTO concessions would have 
been, had the Canadian delegation been successful in negotiating 
them in the 1990s?  I will return to this question in the latter half of 
this paper.  Before doing so, I examine provincial motivation for 
retaining control over their respective procurement decisions. 
 
iii) Provincial Concerns & Hesitations 
 
Provincial motivations, combined with the division of powers 
in Canadian federalism, may have played a role in keeping sub-federal 
procurement obligations out of the GPA and NAFTA.  While the 
federal government under international law has the sole right to 
                                                            
20 EC, Review of National Implementing Legislation – Canada, World Trade 
Organization Doc. GPA/51 (18 
June 2001). 
21 Collins, supra note 11 at 16. 
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negotiate treaties, Canadian domestic law requires international 
agreements that expend public funds or change domestic law to be 
ratified in Canada before they have force or effect.22  Yet, as per the 
Constitution Act 1867, the federal government has no power to ratify 
legislation for issues over which the provinces have jurisdiction. These 
issues include matters such as “local works and undertakings”, which 
Section 92 deems to be under provincial authority.23  Thus, any 
attempt to mandate provincial acceptance of international 
procurement obligations is subject to provincial approval.  Note that 
this differs from the procedure in the United States, where the federal 
government has the power to compel state performance with federally 
implemented international treaty obligations.24  In the US, any failure 
to compel state compliance is generally due to political relations 
between federal and state governments, rather than constitutional 
issues.25 
 So have the provinces been eager to give their approval of 
international procurement obligations?  It is my position that, much 
like the federal government, the provinces have historically seen 
more to be gained from maintaining autonomous control and 
flexibility in their procurement policy rather than increased trade 
restrictions. There are a number of reasons for this. 
 The primary reason for a provincial protectionist attitude is 
financial gain. Cooper discusses this position from the American 
perspective, noting that if states lose their ability to discriminate in 
favour of local businesses, overall national gains may be realized, but 
at the expense of state prosperity.26  The same can be said in the 
Canadian context.  A procurement contract for rail infrastructure in 
Manitoba, for example, might have the effect of increasing 
productivity in neighbouring Ontario; however, if the lowest bidder is 
an Ohio corporation, then the Manitoba construction industry may 
lose out.  In Canada, the provinces are already somewhat committed 
to their provincial neighbours by the Agreement on Internal Trade 
                                                            
22 Francis v. The Queen, [1956] SCR 618 at 625. 
23 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, 
No. 5. s. 92. 
24 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3. 
25 K Cooper, “To Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance With International Trade 
Agreements at the State Level” (1993) 2 Minn. J. Global Trade 143 at 144 [Cooper]. 
26 Ibid, at 166. 
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(“AIT”). This agreement, signed by First Ministers in 1994, prevents 
provincial trade barriers in key areas, and works to reduce existing 
trade barriers.27  For the provinces, already limited in their 
procurement decisions by the AIT, further liberalization at the hands 
of international obligations may be regarded as severely limiting and, 
potentially, economically harmful.  In addition, provincial premiers 
will undoubtedly consider the political ramifications of procurement 
liberalization.  Since the premiers have already lost the ability to 
discriminate between local and Canadian businesses, losing that 
power with respect to foreign businesses could cost them significant 
voter support.  Where provinces do not have domestic industry of a 
size that can compete in the international market, it will be difficult 
to realize a net benefit.  
Another possible reason the provinces did not take proactive 
steps to include themselves in the GPA is the difficulty that comes 
with reviewing disputes over public procurement or negotiating a 
position in the first place.  Just as implementation and negotiation 
costs caused Australia and New Zealand to shy away from the GPA, so 
these costs could have served as a barrier for provincial entities.28  
Especially for the smaller Eastern provinces with fewer government 
support staff, the looming spectre of compliance with broad 
international obligations can be daunting. 
Finally, provincial hesitation may have been due, in part, to 
regionalism and reluctance to bargain with the federal government.  
Canadian federal-provincial relations are rife with regional tensions, 
and in recent decades, phenomenons like ‘western alienation’ have 
complicated matters of provincial-federal comity.29  Further, public 
perception of procurement markets may lean more towards 
protectionism than liberalization. Indeed, unlike international tariffs, 
procurement spending could be viewed more as an internal issue 
where government patronage should play a stronger role.30 
                                                            
27 Agreement on Internal Trade Implementation Act, S.C. 1996, c.17. 
28 M Dischendorfer, “The Existence and Development of Multilateral Rules on 
Government Procurement Under the Framework of the WTO” (2000) 9 Public 
Procurement Law Review 1 at 28. 
29 Collins, supra note 11 at 20. 
30 Christopher McCrudden, “International economic law and the pursuit of human 
rights: A framework for discussion of the legality of 'selective purchasing' laws under 
the WTO Government procurement agreement” (1999) 2 J. Int’l Econ. L. 3 at 11-12. 
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There are reasons, however, for provincial acceptance of 
binding procurement obligations. “Market access” is foremost among 
these. With a large resource pool and relatively small population, 
Canada has always depended on market access for its exports in order 
to remain competitive in its industry and service sectors.  This is 
especially true in the context of Canada’s relation to the United States 
(Canada’s largest trading partner in both imports and exports).  It is 
well within the power of the provinces to cripple their domestic 
industry by engaging in overly protectionist policies with respect to 
government spending, if beneficial reciprocal deals are available with 
trading partners. Failure to accept reciprocal procurement agreements, 
however, is not necessarily protectionist on its face, but could simply 
mean that the available agreements are not beneficial.  Any deal 
entered, therefore, must stand up to scrutiny on an economic 
perspective as well as a political one. 
There is also an argument to be made that market efficiency is 
best served by placing domestic firms in more direct competition with 
foreign counterparts.  By favouring domestic business through 
sheltered procurement processes, provincial governments are tacitly 
providing a form of subsidy which discourages technological 
innovation and efficiency gains.  Again, this argument must be 
reconciled with the need to shelter and protect fledgling domestic 
industries that may struggle in the face of larger foreign counterparts 
wielding economies of scale. 
Collins argues that opening up provincial procurement would 
also allow foreign firms with Canadian outward FDI to do more 
business with Canadian provinces, which would in turn further 
benefit Canadian FDI investors.31  This argument presupposes that 
Canadian provinces do not or cannot currently favour firms with 
Canadian FDI, which is not necessarily the case.  It is well within the 
current ability of the provinces to accept procurement bids from 
foreign competitors.  Assuming that the provinces could politically 
and economically justify the decision to accept a foreign bid (based on 
Canadian FDI investment or ownership), nothing stands in their way.  
There is no reason to assume that provincial inclusion in the GPA 
would foster greater provincial support for Canadian FDI in foreign 
corporations. 
                                                            
31 Collins, supra note 11 at 20. 
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Canadian provinces may also want to agree to open their 
procurement purchasing to foreign competition in a gesture of good-
faith to the international community.  The international trend seems 
to be moving towards increased sub-federal procurement comity, as 
evidenced by China’s recent commitment of sub-central government 
entities in its WTO membership negotiations.32  Like the Chinese, 
Canada could at least commit partial sub-federal coverage, and 
continue to make concessions as the commitments of other nations 
increase, rather than completely excluding sub-federal procurement. 
But this strategy may be too naïve for Canada.  China’s inclusion of 
sub-central entities in the WTO was mainly an attempt to access the 
American procurement markets which have been made available.  
Canada should ensure that it acts cautiously and with appropriate 
strategy towards these two global entities, rather than quickly 
following suit because of an apparent emerging trend. 
Evaluating the various reasons for and against procurement 
liberalization, it is not difficult to see why the provinces have been 
reluctant to commit themselves internationally.  While it may be true, 
as Collins argues, that GPA commitments from the provinces could 
have economic advantages, Canada and its provinces need to carefully 
regulate their commitments as they have done in the past with FDI.  
Just as Chang and Green found that developed western nations 
benefited from strategic control of FDI in the past, and that a failure 
to be strategic now could cripple developing nations,33 so should 
Canada continue to be selective in its procurement commitments. 
 
iv) The Business Perspective, the ARRA, and the Buy American Hype 
 
To this point, I have shown the federal and provincial 
governments’ propensity for selective engagement with FDI—
including foreign bids on government procurement—and advocated 
for a continuation of that policy.  I now turn to examine the 
                                                            
32 T Xinchao, “Chinese Procurement Law: Current Legal Framework and a Transition 
to the WTO GPA” (2003) 17 Temple Int’l & Comp. L.J. 139 at 167. 
33 Ha Joon Chang and Duncan Green, “The Northern WTO Agenda on Investment: 
Do as we Say, Not as we Did” (2003) Research report for the South Centre, 
Intergovernmental Policy Think Tank of Developing Countries, online: 
<http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&
gid=238&Itemid=&lang=en> [Chang]. 
   
15 
controversy over the Buy American provisions of the ARRA. My aim 
is to distil the effects that these provisions might have had if the 
Agreement had not been.  I look first to the scope of American and 
Canadian procurement markets. 
 It is difficult to estimate just how much money Canadian 
businesses stand to make or lose based on liberalization of government 
procurement.  Prior to entering the Agreement, DFAIT commissioned 
two surveys of businesses that sold goods or services to foreign 
governments in an attempt to elicit concrete figures on business 
support for reciprocal government procurement access.  The results of 
these surveys provide useful insight into DFAIT’s motivation to 
conclude the Agreement, and also information on how much business 
is at stake in the government procurement arena.  The first survey, 
concluded in 2001, found, not surprisingly, that the US was the most 
important procurement market for Canadian businesses.  It also found 
that 65% of Canadian businesses surveyed “would be willing to give 
up preferred access to Canadian provincial and local government 
markets on an equal basis with U.S. firms”.34  The survey did not, 
however, indicate that a reciprocal trade agreement would necessarily 
be the best solution to difficulties in securing government 
procurement business.  In fact, the top selected barriers to 
government procurement contracts include “lack of timely 
information on opportunities” and “failure to have opportunities 
announced.”35 
 A second DFAIT survey, conducted in 2008, focused on 
government procurement in eight foreign markets other than the US: 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, UK, France, Germany and Japan.  This 
survey found that 89% of businesses who were not already selling to 
foreign governments had at least some interest in doing so, and that 
72% of businesses surveyed were “not opposed” to opening all levels 
of Canadian procurement to foreign companies in exchange for 
reciprocal access.36  These surveys indicate that there was interest in 
                                                            
34 PriceWaterHouseCoopers, “Study of Market Priorities for Canadian Businesses 
Selling to Foreign Governments: Final Report” Prepared for the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (18 April, 2001) at ii. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Phoenix Strategic Perspectives Inc., “Final Report: Business Survey on Government 
Procurement Market Access Priorities” Prepared for the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade Canada (January 2008) at ii and 8. 
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foreign procurement markets, but, especially concerning the US, the 
businesses do not indicate the extent to which a reciprocal agreement 
would solve their problems.  The surveys are far from conclusive 
evidence that business opinion favoured procurement market 
liberalization prior to the controversy over the ARRA. 
 The ARRA controversy, when it came, was sudden and 
forceful.  The ARRA, regarded as a critical tool in the attempt to slow 
the American recession, was welcomed in the US, but its reception in 
Canada was not so hospitable. When the bill was first introduced, 
some industry leaders pegged the ARRA as catastrophic and 
demanded Canadian political intervention.37  Michael Wilson, 
Canadian ambassador to the United States, wrote that the bill could 
“create a global economic calamity akin to the Great Depression.”38  
The uproar quickly spread to provincial politicians.  By June 9, 2009, 
the premiers were meeting to denounce the provisions of the ARRA, 
arguing that measures needed to be taken immediately: 
Premiers believe the time has come for all orders of 
Government in Canada and the U.S. to engage in a renewed 
era of collaboration to ensure open markets between the 
two countries. Therefore, they support open and inclusive 
discussion of all means, including the negotiation of a 
broad, reciprocal procurement liberalization agreement, 
covering federal, provincial/territorial and state government 
measures, in order to secure mutually-beneficial market 
access and to exclude Canada from the negative effects of 
measures such as Buy American provisions39 
Clearly this was a strong reaction, but just how disastrous were the 
implications of the ARRA? 
 The primary objection to the ARRA was Section 1605, which 
states that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
available by this Act may be used for a project for the construction, 
alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public building or public work 
unless all of the iron, steel, and manufactured goods used in the 
                                                            
37 See the comments of Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters spokesperson Jean-
Michel Laurin, MacCharles, supra note 2. 
38 Sheldon Alberts, “U.S. protectionism could set off ‘downward spiral,’ Canada 
warns”, The National Post (2 February 2009) online: 
<http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=1244646>. 
39 Council June 09, supra note 3. 
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project are produced in the United States” (emphasis added).40  This 
provision made funding contingent on purchasing American value-
added goods, with the following exceptions: if doing so would be 
contrary to the public interest; if the needed goods weren’t available 
in the needed quantity; or if costs would increase by more than 25% 
on the project in question.  In response to criticism outside of the US, 
the US Senate also added a clause to Section 1605 which states that 
the section should be applied in a manner consistent with US 
obligations under international agreements.41  Yet this last provision 
would have had little effect. It may have served to alleviate public 
tension, but as the US does not have sub-federal obligations to Canada 
under international agreements, the ramifications of this clause are 
negligible.  Under NAFTA there are no covered sub-federal entities, 
and under the GPA the US’ Annex 2 specifically exempted Canada 
(before the conclusion of the Agreement).42 
 The other provision that attracted widespread criticism was 
Section 604, which applied American production requirements to a 
broad range of goods purchased by the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”).  This provision was of less concern, given that the 
DHS is covered by federal procurement obligations to Canada under 
NAFTA; however, certain agencies within the DHS, like the US Coast 
Guard, are not explicitly mentioned in NAFTA, other than within 
national security exemptions.43  This left agencies like the Coast Guard 
with a confusing array of obligations to meet, and could have resulted 
in Canadian suppliers losing contracts as a result of actual or perceived 
effects of the Section 604.  Perceived effects also may have affected 
Canadian suppliers under Section 1605.  According to an update 
released by Canadian law firm Bennett Jones LLP, there was evidence 
to suggest that US distributors, eager to stay on the right side of the 
new law and maintain their contingent funding, chose not to stock 
                                                            
40 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 1605(a) (2009). 
41 “US Senate eases ‘trade war’ bill” BBC News (5 February 2009), online: BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7871219.stm>. 
42 As part of the Agreement, the US removed the Canadian exemption from its Annex 
2 text.  For more detail see the WTO Commitments section of this paper below, 
explaining how US and Canadian obligations have permanently changed as a result of 
the Agreement. 
43 NAFTA, supra note 8, at Annex 1001.1a-1 (US list of Federal Entities). 
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Canadian goods in order to avoid confusion when supplying state or 
municipally funded projects.44 
 The Canadian discomfort towards the ARRA appears even 
more justified when considered in light of the NAFTA-based dispute 
ADF Group Inc v. USA.  At issue in ADF was Section 102.05 of a 
construction contract between a US purchaser and Canadian supplier, 
which stated that “all iron and steel products (including miscellaneous 
steel items such as fasteners, nuts, bolts and washers) incorporated for 
use on this project shall be produced in the United States of America; 
unless the use of any such items will increase the cost of the overall 
project by more than 25%” (emphasis added).45  The tribunal also 
defined the production process at issue in much the same way as the 
ARRA, including in ‘production’ any process of altering or 
transforming raw material into an item or product which differs from 
the original.  The tribunal in ADF ultimately found that the investor’s 
NAFTA claim was not made out because they had not adequately 
shown that the cost of the project would increase or that alternate 
products were not available (a troubling precedent for Canadians 
hoping to make use of the Section 1605 exceptions). 
 So, with restrictive legislative provisions and exceptions 
interpreted in a discomforting fashion, were Canadians right to fear 
the ARRA?  A further look at the economic context suggests that 
perhaps they were not. 
 One particular Canadian concern was the $61 billion dollars 
earmarked for transportation projects within the ARRA.  As the third 
largest category of allocated funds, next to the Medicaid and Health-
Labor-Education categories, transportation funding rightly attracted 
the attention of competitive Canadian steel and iron manufacturers.46  
This concern, however, was misplaced.  It failed to consider the 
provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”), on 
the books since 1982, which incorporates restrictive Buy-American 
provisions originally found in the Buy American Act of 1933.  In fact, 
the text Section 1605 of the ARRA mirrors almost exactly the 
provisions of the STAA, which also mandates a preference for US 
                                                            
44 Barutciski, supra note 3. 
45 AGF Group Inc. v. USA (2003) 18 ICSID Rev. 195 at para 58. 
46 Karin Yourish, “A Breakdown of the Final Bill” The Washington Post, online: 
<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sell2usgov-
vendreaugouvusa/assets/pdfs/sell2usgov/breakdown_final_bill_021409.pdf>. 
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steel, iron, or goods for use in federally funded mass-transit projects.47  
As a result, Canadian investment in this sector of US procurement is 
already low, and, even if amended or rescinded, Section 1605 of the 
ARRA isn’t likely to change that. 
 Outside of the transportation sector, the effect of Section 1605 
may not have been large in scope either.  Prior to the ARRA, US sub-
federal governments and agencies were already free to impose 
restrictions on Canadian businesses; indeed, many were already in the 
practice of doing so.  According to DFAIT, US procurement agencies 
regularly required more favourable pricing by up to 15% from 
Canadian suppliers.48  As a result, Canadian companies doing business 
at the sub-federal level were well accustomed to restrictive pricing 
tactics and used competitive tactics to work around such practices.  
Since the ARRA would only mandate another 10% price reduction 
from American suppliers before a Canadian supplier could be 
considered, the effects may not have been as severe as perceived. 
 Finally, the application of the Section 1605 exceptions may 
not have been as restrictive as contemplated by the ADF precedent.  
The exception for “unavailable articles” is currently recognized by the 
US government to apply to a large list of items, including common 
metals and materials like nickel and rubber.49  Small exceptions even 
exist for highly contested Canadian steel products in certain 
infrastructure products.  The Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”), for example, has granted a nationwide de minimus 
exemption to Canadian steel so long as it comprises less than 5% of 
the total project.50  The EPA also secured a ‘public interest’ exemption 
from Section 1605 for Clean Drinking Water projects which were 
                                                            
47 Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5323j. 
48 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Buy American Primer, 
online: <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sell2usgov-
vendreaugouvusa/assets/pdfs/sell2usgov/BAAPrimer_eng.pdf>. 
49 See the current updated list of unavailable articles online: 
<https://www.acquisition.gov/far/current/html/Subpart%2025_1.html#wp1118883>. 
50 Micheal H. Shapiro, Acting Assistant Administrator for Water: Environmental 
Protection Agency, “Notice of nationwide waiver of Section 1605 (Buy American 
Requriement) of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) for de 
minimis incidental components of projects financed through the Clean or Drinking 
Water State Revolving Funds using assistance provided under ARRA” (22 May 2009). 
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negotiated in the 4 months before the enactment of the ARRA.51 
While these exceptions are far from all-encompassing, they point to 
the reasonableness of US agencies in their procurement dealings, and 
indicate that, were such concessions not obviated by the Agreement, 
more concessions may have been forthcoming in the future. 
 Nevertheless, the objections to the ARRA continued to come 
from many sectors in Canada, placing increasing pressure on Canadian 
politicians to respond. 
 
III 
ANALYZING THE AGREEMENT 
 
On February 5, 2010, Canadian Minister of International 
Trade Peter Van Loan announced that the Canadian and American 
governments had concluded an agreement that promised Canadian 
companies the concessions they had been seeking: exemption from 
Section 1605 of the ARRA.  Beyond this exemption, the deal also gave 
Canadian companies access to the sub-federal American entities in the 
US GPA Annex and fast-tracked similar future negotiations, “should 
similar Buy American provisions be applied to future funding 
programs"—a situation which sounds much more like a ‘when’ than 
an ‘if’.52  Whether or not this agreement provides a net benefit to 
Canada, and is justified given the context in which it was created, is 
the subject of the remainder of this paper. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
51 Micheal H. Shapiro, Acting Assistant Administrator for Water: Environmental 
Protection Agency, “Notice of nationwide waiver of Section 1605 (Buy American 
Requriement) of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) for 
projects that solicited bids on or after October 1, 2008 and prior to February 17, 2009 
that are financed through the Clean or Drinking Water State Revolving Funds using 
assistance provided under ARRA” (22 May 2009). 
52 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, News Release, 56 “Canada 
and United States reach agreement on Buy American” (5 February 2010), online: 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/news-
communiques/2010/056.aspx>. 
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i) WTO GPA Commitments 
 
At the outset, it is important to mention that the GPA has 
been undergoing a series of revisions intended to: make it easier to 
navigate; account for electronic bidding and procurement tools; and 
update the review procedures for arbitration processes.53  As a result, 
the Agreement between Canada and the US was reached pursuant to 
the “Revised Text of the Agreement on Government Procurement 
(Articles I-XXI) as at 13 November 2007 (WTO Document negs 268 
(19 November 2007)).”54  This revised GPA text is, unfortunately, not 
available to the public at this time.  As a result, I evaluate the 
Agreement’s changes by reference to the “Revision of the Agreement 
on Government Procurement as at 8 December 2006”, the most recent 
provisionally agreed upon text of the GPA.55  Currently there are 
mixed reviews of the Revised GPA. Arie Reich, in a detailed 
comparison of the new text, found it to be a slight improvement over 
the 1994 GPA, but with serious flaws in the new review and 
arbitration procedures.  Other scholars have given it a more 
favourable review.56 Suffice to say, for the purposes of this paper, that 
both Canada and the US are working within the confines of the 
Revised GPA, or at least a slightly modified version of the Revised 
GPA. 
 
i. (a) American Commitments 
 
Article IV of the Agreement outlines the changes made by the 
American government to its commitments under the GPA.  Prior to 
                                                            
53 World Trade Organization, “The re-negotiation of the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA)” online: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/negotiations_e.htm>. 
54 Agreement, at Article II. 
55 Revision of the Agreement on Government Procurement as at 8 December 2006, 
WTO Document GPA/W/297, (11 December 2006).  The full text of the RGPA is 
available from the WTO website, online: < 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/PLURI/GPA/W297.d
oc>. 
56 Arie Reich, “The New Text of the Agreement on Government Procurement: An 
Analysis and Assessment” (2009) J. Int’l Econ. L. 989 at pg 1021. 
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the conclusion of the Agreement, Note 5 of the General Notes to the 
US Annexes read: 
For goods and services (including construction) of the 
following countries and suppliers of such goods and services, 
this Agreement does not apply to procurement by the entities 
listed in Annexes 2 and 3 or the waiver described in Annex 3: 
Canada 
The United States is prepared to amend this note at such time 
as coverage with respect to these annexes can be resolved 
with a Party listed above.57 
Article IV of the Agreement requires the US to “delete the reference 
to Canada with respect to Annex 2”, thus allowing Canada access to all 
of the sub-federal US entities who procure in accordance with the 
GPA.58  While American sub-federal inclusion in the GPA was 
initially meagre, as a result of federal prompting the US has included a 
significant number of sub-federal entities in its Annex 2 since as early 
as 2002.  Currently, 37 states are at least partially represented.  
Generally, the states who have accepted the GPA list their central 
procurement agency (by its respective name) or the blanket 
“executive branch agencies” within Annex 2, ensuring that the GPA 
provisions will apply to most procurement decisions. 
 The 13 states that remain absent, however, mark a substantial 
part of the American population.  Ohio, Georgia, and North Carolina, 
for example, three of the top ten most populated states in America, are 
absent from Annex 2.  Annex 2 also includes a number of notable 
specific exceptions.  Procurement of construction-grade steel, motor 
vehicles, and coal is exempted from the following states: Delaware, 
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New York, New 
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming.  In addition, 
procurement for all of the 37 listed states is exempted from the GPA if 
the procurement is by way of federally originating funds intended for 
mass transit or highway projects.59 
                                                            
57 GPA, supra note 9 at USA Annex General Notes, Note 5. 
58 Agreement, supra note 4 at Article IV. 
59 GPA, supra note 9 at USA Annex 2. 
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 The US Annex 2 threshold for services and supplies are also 
among the highest of the WTO parties to the GPA.  Much like under 
NAFTA, the provisions of the GPA apply only to selected entities, and 
only if the total cost of the procurement in question exceeds a certain 
threshold.  The GPA uses generic threshold figures called Special 
Drawing Rights (“SDR”) throughout its provision, allowing for revised 
dollar figures to be submitted by the parties annually instead of 
requiring a full revised text each year.  Currently, one SDR is equal to 
roughly 1.7 Canadian Dollars, and thus an SDR of 355,000 would 
equal approximately $604,500 Canadian.60  The American Annex 2 
threshold is 355,000SDR for supplies and services, and 5 million SDR 
for construction projects.  While the construction threshold is 
standard, the supplies and services threshold is higher than most GPA 
signatories by 155,000SDR.61 
 
i. (b) Canadian Commitments 
 
 Because it did not previously have any entities listed in its 
Annex 2, Canada's commitment regarding the GPA is much longer 
than that of the US.  Article III of the Agreement commits Canada to 
submitting a package of revised Annexes (Annexes 2, 4, 5, and 
General Notes) which mirror Appendix A of the Agreement to the 
WTO.  Currently, these revised Annexes will benefit only the US, as a 
result of a restrictive note inserted into Canada’s new General Notes, 
although the notes make it clear that Canada is willing to negotiate 
mutually acceptable agreements with the other WTO parties.62 
 The new Canadian Annex 2 covers all of the provinces and 
territories (except Nunavut), and applies the provisions of the GPA to 
almost all of the government departments within those provinces and 
territories.  Like the US, however, there are some exceptions.  Alberta 
and BC exempt the Legislative Assembly from Annex 2, which would 
                                                            
60 The thresholds in appendix I of the agreement as expressed in national currencies 
for 2010-2011, WTO Doc GPA/W/309/Add.2 (21 December 2009). 
61 The relative thresholds of each GPA signatory are listed on the WTO website, 
online: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/thresh_e.htm>. 
62 Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix A, General Note 6, which reads: “With the 
exception of the United States of America, the offer by Canada with respect to goods 
and services (including construction) in Annex 2 is subject to negotiation of mutually 
acceptable commitments (including thresholds) with other Parties.” 
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seemingly exempt any procurement ordered directly by provincial 
legislation.  Ontario exempts all “urban rail and transport equipment, 
systems, components…as well as all project-related materials”.  
Québec exempts any procurement of construction-grade steel.  In 
addition to these specifics, general exemptions are made for all of the 
following: highway projects, school boards and academic institution 
construction procurement (outside of Ontario and Québec), Crown 
corporations, and procurement of goods purchased for 
representational or promotional purposes (in a selection of provinces, 
including Ontario). 
Finally, in a vague exception, all “procurement that is 
intended to contribute to economic development” in the Yukon or 
Northwest Territories, or Atlantic Canada or Manitoba, is exempt.  
Use of this exemption, however, would likely be limited to situations 
where Canada has an established program in place to aid in the 
development of a disadvantaged region, such as the Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency.63 Canada also adopts the US SDR thresholds: 
355,000 for goods and services and 5 million for construction 
services.64 
 
i. (c) Evaluating the Reciprocal Commitments 
 
Of all the Canadian commitments in the Agreement, Canada’s 
commitments to the GPA are the least troubling.  For one, Canada 
was under an obligation, as per Article XXIV 7(b) of the GPA, to 
undertake further negotiations to liberalize the scope of Canadian 
entities which procured according to WTO guidelines.65  Canada had 
shirked this responsibility for a long time.  Making the commitments 
now will undoubtedly elicit support from supporters of free trade as 
well as other WTO GPA members.  In fact, had Canada not made 
Annex 2 GPA commitments in the Agreement, there is reason to 
believe that they may have done so without US prompting.  
                                                            
63 The ACOA, established over 20 years ago, works to “create opportunities for 
economic growth in Atlantic Canada by helping businesses become more competitive, 
innovative and productive, by working with diverse communities to develop and 
diversify local economies, and by championing the strengths of Atlantic Canada”. See 
more information online at: <http://www.acoa.ca/English/Pages/Home.aspx>. 
64 Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix A, Annex 2. 
65 GPA, supra note 9 at Article XXIV:7(b). 
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Notwithstanding pressure from the WTO and other states to include 
Annex 2 entities, academics have also begun to take notice of Canada’s 
Annex 2 exclusions and call for a response.66  Even for those who 
generally oppose increased international trade, the fact that these 
WTO commitments currently apply only to the US should offer some 
reassurance.  This is not a headlong plunge into uncharted waters.  
Rather, by making commitments to the US and waiting to negotiate 
with others, Canada is taking a more sequenced approach. 
 Nevertheless, Canada’s commitments must be weighed against 
what it was able to achieve in return.  It is true that the Canadian 
exclusions are broad in scope, but some of them merely balance the 
exclusions maintained by the United States.  Exceptions for highway 
projects and the restrictive SDR threshold, for example, clearly track 
the American provisions.  Québec’s steel exemption also appears to 
save a valued provincial procurement market.  When considered in 
light of the much broader exemption of steel, coal, and motor vehicles 
in 12 large populated US states, however, it pales in comparison.  The 
Canadian exemptions for Crown corporations, academic or 
educational facility construction, and “economic development” in 
selected areas are likely to be the most beneficial as measured by their 
ability to retain provincial control over procurement.  Even so, these 
must be considered against the backdrop of partial American GPA 
coverage.  Canada has committed all of its provinces and territories 
(aside from Nunavut) to the GPA, while the US has retained control 
over procurement in a quarter of its state entities.  It could be argued 
that Canada’s “economic development” exemption is an attempt to 
respond to the absence of 13 US states; but, in order to rely on that 
exemption, Canada faces an onerous burden of proof.  In contrast, the 
13 exempted states can simply claim immunity from the provisions of 
the GPA. 
 Criticism for the provincial acceptance of GPA responsibilities 
can also be made on the basis that the provinces are losing valued 
resource control that is needed for specific development goals.  I 
alluded earlier to the study by Chang and Green which advocates 
against multilateral investment obligations for the third world, on the 
basis that surrendering control over these decisions will be 
                                                            
66 Collins, supra note 11. 
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detrimental to development goals.67  The same concerns are present in 
debates over procurement obligations.  WTO critics like Christopher 
McCrudden have long expounded the dangerous local consequences 
of accepting international obligations, and also the possible human 
rights implications of treaties like the GPA.68 The GPA itself 
recognizes these concerns, and gives special rights to developing 
nations who might otherwise be adversely affected by overbearing 
procurement commitments.69 In doing so it acknowledges the 
potentially damaging effects of trade liberalization where strict 
control is needed to foster economic development.  Though Canada 
has included the economic development provision, it does not apply 
to the western provinces, Ontario, or Québec, and as we have seen in 
recent years, economic downturns can threaten workers across the 
country, even in otherwise prosperous locations.   Thus, any loss of 
discretion on procurement decisions could increase the strain on 
troubled Canadian industry. 
 These lasting provincial GPA commitments are also troubling 
due to the environment in which they were reached: an emotionally 
and politically charged flurry of attention.  The fact that the provinces 
had been given the opportunity for 15 years to initiate negotiations 
with the federal government on GPA commitment, but only chose to 
do so once they came under pressure for doing nothing about the 
ARRA, indicates that this agreement was entered hastily rather than 
thoughtfully to provide the best long-term outcome for Canada.  Why 
were permanent sub-federal commitments even necessary if the main 
concern was over restrictive ARRA provisions, which are addressed in 
a separate agreement?  Negotiated together, as they were, it seems 
more likely that these less-than-ideal permanent Canadian 
commitments were used as a bargaining chip in order to convince the 
US to allow Canada the exemptions that it sought under the ARRA.  If 
Canada had been negotiating these permanent commitments 
separately, surely the hype over the ARRA would have put less 
                                                            
67 Chang, supra note 40. 
68 McCrudden has argued that the United States has used procurement purchasing 
power through state legislation to influence the human rights policies of states such as 
Myanmar (Burma).  See Christopher McCrudden, “International economic law and 
the pursuit of human rights: A framework for discussion of the legality of 'selective 
purchasing' laws under the WTO Government procurement agreement” (1999) 2 J. 
Int’l Econ. L. 48. 
69 GPA, supra note 9 at Article V. 
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pressure on the negotiators to reach a settlement, and the inequalities 
of the reciprocal provisions here would have been more apparent. 
 This leads to another important basis for criticism of the 
permanent commitments: reciprocity.  Reciprocity, though an 
ambiguous term, generally encompasses the giving and receiving of 
equivalent rights and obligations.70  The difficulty comes in evaluating 
an 'equivalent value', especially in negotiations such as these over 
government procurement.  Canada and the US are not nations of 
equal size or stature.  With a population almost ten times that of 
Canada, the US stands to have far more firms operating in any given 
field.  Thus when Canada opens a section of its market to the US, the 
chances of US firms noticing and posting bids to opportunities in that 
market is greater than the chance of Canadian firms doing the same 
towards an equal sized US market opening.  While it is true that in 
any given sector Canada may have fewer opportunities on which to 
bid, the likelihood of each Canadian opportunity receiving a US bid is 
greater than each US opportunity receiving a Canadian bid.  For this 
reason one might generally expect Canada to open a comparably 
smaller portion of its provincial procurement market, proportional to 
the amount of business Canadian companies can roughly expect to bid 
on in the US.  Yet in this deal we see a greater scope of Canadian 
coverage.  The effect could be to leave the US market (while 
admittedly ‘open’ to Canadian bids) relatively free from Canadian 
business, while the Canadian market is receiving American bids for 
every opportunity it advertises.  Surely a better arrangement was 
possible. 
 
ii) ARRA Exemptions and Commitments 
 
In addition to permanent GPA changes, both Canada and the 
US have agreed on several specific, temporary measures to facilitate a 
more open system of government procurement.  These measures are 
effective from February 17, 2010 until September 30, 2011.  It is these 
temporary measures, breaking new and open ground in the field of 
procurement purchasing, which are the most contentious of the 
Agreement. 
                                                            
70 Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations” (1986) 40 International 
Organization 1 at 8. 
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ii. (a) American Commitments 
 
The first commitment from the US is not actually a temporary 
commitment, but, due to the temporary nature of the ARRA, it tacitly 
functions as one.  In Article V of the Agreement, the US agrees to 
“take the necessary administrative steps to ensure that section 1605(a) 
of the [ARRA] shall not be applied to Canadian iron, steel, or 
manufactured goods in procurement covered by Annex 2 of the 1994 
GPA.”71  The key part of this article is the mention of “administrative 
steps”.  Since, with the new GPA commitments, a Canadian investor 
who feels slighted by the ARRA now has the ability to file a dispute 
under the GPA, this provision is designed to alleviate concerns that 
businesses will have to follow through a lengthy dispute process.  It 
attempts to put the responsibility on the US government to ensure 
that the new GPA commitments are honoured and that the ARRA 
does not intrude, rather than leave the complaining to the Canadian 
investor.  However, this applies only to procurement covered by the 
new Annex 2. 
 The real temporary measures committed to by the US come in 
Article VII.  The US chose to implement its GPA commitments by 
modifying its Annex 3 with a list of programs for which it will not 
apply Section 1605(a) of the ARRA.  The exempted US programs are: 
 
 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Utilities 
Services, Water and Waste Disposal Programs 
 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Housing 
Services, Community Facilities Program 
 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency 
and Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Block Grants 
 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency 
and Renewable Energy, State Energy Program 
 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Office of Community Planning and Development, 
Community Development Block Grants Recovery 
 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Office of Public and Indian Housing, Public Housing 
Capital Fund 
                                                            
71 Agreement, supra note 4 at Article V. 
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 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water 
and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds, for projects 
funded by reallocated ARRA Funds where the contracts 
are signed after February 17, 2010.72 
 
Since the only exemption applied to these programs is Section 
1605(a) of the ARRA, only construction contracts will be affected by 
these temporary measures, and construction contacts are still subject 
to the Annex 3 threshold, currently valued at 5million SDR (or 
8.5million Canadian dollars).  Also, there are no exemptions from 
Section 604 of the ARRA; as a result, procurement from certain 
agencies within the DHS could still face restrictive Buy American 
provisions. 
 
ii. (b) Canadian Commitments 
 
Canada chose to implement its temporary measures by 
creating an entirely new agreement in Appendix C of the Agreement 
(which functions almost as a mini-GPA).  This strategy makes the 
most practical sense, since Canada does not have a specific list of 
programs to exempt, and would otherwise have had to draft an 
agreement which selectively applied only specific parts of the GPA, in 
order to constrain its agreement to construction services.  This tactic 
also allowed Canada to include some general exceptions to its 
otherwise broad commitment that would not have been covered 
under the GPA.  One such exemption is for entities operating sporting 
or convention facilities who are complying with commercial 
contracts, thus allowing any Vancouver Olympic procurement to 
continue as planned.73 
 Beyond some minor differences in exemptions, such as the 
one mentioned above, Canada’s Appendix C basically tracks the 
Articles of the GPA, although with slightly simplified bidding and 
tendering rules.  The domestic review requirements of Appendix C 
are similar to the GPA, with some noticeable elements removed from 
the administrative rules of a reviewing body, including the right for 
all parties to be heard prior to a decision being made on a challenge by 
                                                            
72 Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix B, USA Annex 3, List C. 
73 Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix C, para 2(a)(ii). 
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an investor.74  This modification allows a simpler review procedure, 
and less input from the aggrieved US investor, should Canada be the 
subject of a dispute. 
 Canada’s commitment is realized at the end of Appendix C, 
where the covered entities and municipalities are listed.  As with the 
US, these temporary measures apply only over an $8.5 million 
(Canadian dollar) threshold, but the list of Canadian entities that is 
covered is staggering.  All major Canadian municipalities are covered, 
including all cities in British Columbia, Calgary, Edmonton, 
Winnipeg, Toronto, Halifax, Montréal, Hamilton, London, Québec 
City, and Ottawa.  A large number of Crown corporations are 
covered, with notable exceptions generally made for energy 
producing Crown corporations such as Ontario Power Generation and 
Régie de l’énergie.  Exceptions are also made for mass-transit and 
highway projects in both Ontario and Québec (at Québec’s 
discretion).  Beyond these exclusions, though, Canada’s commitment 
is broad.75 
 
ii. (c) Evaluating the Reciprocal Commitments 
 
The only reason for Canada to commit its municipalities and 
other entities as listed in Annex 3 was to give Canadian businesses a 
chance to share in the spoils of the money allocated by the ARRA.  
Thus, the evaluation of Canada’s temporary commitments under the 
Agreement faces tougher scrutiny. 
 Most of this evaluation turns on how much of the ARRA 
funding Canadian contractors are able to bid on.  Of the 787 billion 
dollars the ARRA promised to allocate, 275 billion is earmarked for 
contract, grant, and loan funding which would be open to Canadian 
bids.  The rest is dispersed through tax benefits and entitlement 
funding such as increased social service payouts.  The problem is that, 
by the time the Agreement was reached, most of those 275 billion 
dollars had already been spent.  According to data compiled by the US 
government in the reporting period from February 17, 2009 (when 
the ARRA was passed) until December 31, 2009, 182 billion dollars of 
                                                            
74 Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix C, para 21. 
75 Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix C, Part B. 
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the available 275 billion had been awarded to successful bidders.76  
This left just 93 billion for allocation in 2010, and even less by 
February 17, 2010, when Canadian companies were released from the 
restrictive provisions of the ARRA.  This figure also does not take into 
account that Canadian companies can only bid on programs funded 
under one of the seven exempted programs under the US Annex 3, 
which together only encompass a portion of the programs undertaken 
by four US departments.  Moreover, these four departments together 
concluded only 15% of the contracts awarded pursuant to the 
ARRA.77 
Even without exact figures, the deal seems one sided.  Canada, 
albeit with a smaller population and economy, has sacrificed its ability 
to support Canadian businesses at almost every level of government—
federal, provincial, municipal, and through Crown corporations—in 
exchange for an opportunity at the funding behind seven US 
procurement programs.  As was discovered in the DFAIT 
commissioned surveys, not all of our construction entities deal with 
the US government, and many have no plans to do so.  Even if they 
did, much of the funding has already been spent, and sub-contracts 
have already been designed with the ARRA provisions in mind.  In an 
editorial for the Toronto Star, columnist Scott Sinclair estimated that 
Canadian companies would be able to bid for no more than 4 to 5 
billion dollars of the total 275 billion, a dramatically smaller 
estimation than the hype around the ARRA seems to have 
contemplated.  He also estimated the value of the Canadian municipal 
procurement market envisioned by Appendix C at 25 billion dollars.78  
Sinclair’s perspective on the deal has been criticized by free-trade 
supporters, but his figures have not.79 
                                                            
76 Recovery.gov, online: <http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/home.aspx>. 
77 Based on calculations from data as of February 13, 2010 pulled from the Federal 
Business Opportunities website (www.fbo.gov), which provides award records for US 
procurement contracts online: 
<ftp://ftp.fbo.gov/FBORecoveryAwards/FBORecoveryAwards20100213.csv>. 
78 Scott Sinclair, “Canada gives away the store in return for scraps from the US” The 
Toronto Star (19 February 2010), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/opinion/article/767780--canada-gives-away-the-store-in-
return-for-scraps-from-u-s>. 
79 Stephen Gordon, “Bad news is when you have to release the hostages too cheaply”, 
National Post 922 February 2010), online: 
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Even assuming that the numbers are equal, and that Canada 
would have temporary access to the same amount of procurement 
business that the US will have access to in Canada, the deal is subject 
to criticism.  For one, this Agreement contradicts the traditional 
Canadian approach to FDI, as explained previously, at a time when 
support for domestic industry is critical.  The effects of the 2008 
economic slowdown are unfolding in the Canadian economy, and the 
Canadian stimulus spending (which has helped ease the effects of the 
recession so far) is drying up.  Measures taken under Canada’s 
Economic Action Plan, affecting spending at all three levels of 
government, are expected to cease funding projects by March 31, 
2010.80  With Canadian stimulus funding nearing its end, it will be 
even more important over the next year for Canadian construction 
services to be able to secure contracts for government procurement 
that are not the product of stimulus spending. This will be 
increasingly difficult until the expiration of the Agreement.  This 
outcome is akin to the dangers warned of in the Gray Report, where it 
was cautioned that entry by foreign industry could prevent Canadian 
companies from developing.81  The danger is that American businesses 
could cause the stagnation of Canadian companies that have already 
developed, by dominating the increasingly small government 
procurement market. 
These temporary commitments are also subject to criticism 
based on the context in which they were concluded.  While Canada 
may not have had 15 years to begin negotiations regarding the ARRA, 
it certainly seems as though Canadian politicians reacted to public 
outcry, rather than attempting to undertake a planned and measured 
response on the enactment of the ARRA.  The August 20, 2009, letter 
from Canadian Trade Minister Stockwell Day to US Trade 
Representative Ronald Kirk, making an initial proposal and seeking 
Canadian exemption, is indicative of this hasty response.  For one, the 
letter came six months after the enactment of the ARRA, instead of 
prior to or close to February 18, 2009.  Also, the tone of the letter 
indicates the ‘on bended knee’ approach that Minister Day adopted, 
                                                                                                                                     
<http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2010/02/22/stephen-
gordon-bad-news-is-when-you-have-to-release-the-hostages-too-cheaply.aspx>. 
80 Canada, Governor General, Speech from the Throne, 40th Parl. 3rd sess., (3 March 
2010). 
81 Gray, supra note 13 at 43. 
   
33 
referring several times to the “ambitious package of sub-federal 
procurement” which Canada is offering to the US.82 
Details of the negotiations are not readily available to the 
public, so the preliminary offer made on August 20th is one of the few 
sources of information we have about how the negotiations were 
concluded.  From an examination of this offer, it seems as though 
Canada’s negotiating team was not totally without success.  In this 
initial letter, Canada offered to concede municipal and Crown 
corporation procurement, of not just construction but all goods, and a 
limited segment of additional services.83  The narrowing of Canada’s 
offer is positive, but this must be matched against the US reservations.  
Initially, Day asked for exemption from all the Buy American 
requirements in the ARRA and exemption from similar requirements 
in any future US legislation.84  What he eventually received was 
exemption from 7 ARRA programs and an expedited negotiation 
forum (in which Canada will no doubt be asked to make further 
procurement concessions) should future Buy American provisions be 
enacted.  Clearly the disparity between the commitments is 
substantial and in favour of US interests. 
Finally, it should be repeated that the exact impact of the 
ARRA has always been in question.  It may well have been within the 
capacity of Canadian companies already operating in the US 
procurement sector to work within the confines of a 25% price 
increase limitation, since most of them were used to functioning in a 
market where their prices needed to be highly favourable to be 
competitive.  Thus the ARRA might have had a negligible effect on 
them.  As for other companies considering entering this market, I am 
sceptical that the details and nuances of the Agreement would be 
made known to them in time for them to submit bids for the few 
projects left with ARRA funding.  Even if they were able to place bids 
on ARRA funded projects, restrictive Buy American provisions in 
place under other US legislation, including the STTA, are still in place 
and will continue to have detrimental effects for Canadian businesses.  
Canadian negotiators failed to win exclusion from STTA Buy 
                                                            
82 Letter from Honourable Stockwell Day to Honorable Ronald Kirk (20 August 2009) 
[unpublished] [Day]. 
83 Ibid at “Canadian Proposal”, enclosure to Letter from Honourable Stockwell Day to 
Honorable Ronald Kirk. 
84 Day, supra note 89. 
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American provisions, and do not even seem to have contemplated 
doing so, even while creating a ‘mechanism’ to quickly resolve 
objection to any future Buy American legislation.  It appears, rather, 
that Canada, eager to get any agreement at all, hastily agreed to a 
lopsided deal to resolve an issue which, in any event, may have had 
only negligible effects. 
 
IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The dramatic expansion in global trade and international investment 
in recent decades has placed issues of trade protectionism in the 
center of public attention.  This paper has left aside a detailed 
discussion of these large, fiercely debated, issues and instead focused 
on government procurement as a special subset of international trade 
and FDI.  I have shown reason why Canada has strived, not to be 
protectionist, but to carefully approach its decisions with respect to 
government procurement, specifically because it is an important way 
in which to promote growth and development in the domestic 
economy.  While some might argue that the government should strive 
for lower prices at all costs, I have shown that the Canadian federal 
and provincial governments have historically taken a more nuanced 
approach, and I have advocated that this approach continue. 
 Unfortunately, in response to the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, this nuanced approach became more of a blind 
reaction to public demands for action.  The Canadian government 
hastily negotiated and concluded an agreement which has left little of 
its sub-federal government procurement discretion available.  This 
response has overlooked many of the factors that indicate that the 
ARRA would not have had as serious an impact on Canadian 
businesses as the media attention seemed to indicate, and committed 
Canada to permanent and temporary agreements (which may put 
large sectors of Canadian industry at risk from American competitors).  
As one National Post writer adroitly observed, “The recent resolution 
of Canada's dispute over Buy American provisions in the U.S. stimulus 
package contributed to the positive tone of the premiers meeting with 
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governors at a downtown Washington hotel.”85  It is not surprising 
that the governors were in such good spirits while hosting their 
Canadian counterparts, having just bested them in such crucial 
negotiations.  No doubt the American celebrations will continue as 
the full effects of the Agreement begin to become apparent.  The 
question is, to what extent will the Canadian lamentations be felt, and 
what lessons will be learned for Canadian politicians who seek 
increased liberalization of Canadian procurement markets in the 
future? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
85 Sheldon Alberts, “U.S. governors sing the praises of Canada” The National Post (21 
February 2010), online: <http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=2594105>. 
